Washington is about to screw Libya over again
On paper, Libya is one. It has one flag, one UN seat, and – as of April 11, 2026 – its first unified budget in 13 years. Yet, beneath lies a deepening fracture. While the international community celebrates the 190-billion-dinar “breakthrough,” the reality is a tale of two Libyas. This is functional fragmentation, where rival governments share a bank account while remaining at each other’s throats for the keys to the state.
The paradox of the April 11 agreement is that this technical “breakthrough” effectively serves as a survival kit for the status quo. By allocating 190 billion dinars ($30 billion) across a divided landscape, Central Bank Governor Naji Issa has created a budget trap. This financial lifeline allows the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Osama Hammad-led administration in the East – the Haftar family’s administrative arm – to maintain their patron-client networks without political compromise.
Crucially, by formalizing these payments, the Central Bank has granted the Eastern authorities an implicit recognition that the international community officially denies them. Ironically, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) welcomed the budget on April 12 as “important progress,” seemingly unaware that by validating the purse, they are subsidizing the very division they are tasked to end. Rather than incentivizing a single government, the budget funds the infrastructure of the split. It ensures both administrations remain wealthy enough to stay in power, but never strong enough to defeat the other – creating the world’s most expensive stalemate.
This financial “truce” seems to be the centerpiece of a pragmatic, Washington-driven strategy. Massad Boulos, US senior adviser for Arab and African affairs, has pivoted toward unifying Libya’s purse and perimeter before tackling leadership. The most striking manifestation was the Flintlock 2026 military exercises in Sirte on April 14. For the first time, forces from both East and West trained side-by-side under US Africa Command (AFRICOM) – a development that would make Muammar Gaddafi turn in his grave.
Yet, this outside-in integration risks mistaking coordination for cohesion. While Boulos frames these milestones as the bedrock of a future state, they currently formalize a duopoly of power. The presence of Saddam Haftar alongside Lt. Gen. John Brennan in Sirte confirms a US shift toward transactional realism, prioritizing “stabilization” over suffrage. By strengthening technical committees while the 6+6 Committee remains deadlocked over election laws and candidate eligibility, the international strategy is inadvertently building a more efficient cage.
Institutions now work together just enough to keep rival elites in place, indefinitely suspending the elections Libyans have been waiting for.
Beneath the veneer of financial and military coordination lies a far more destructive schism: the total disintegration of Libya’s legal architecture. While the international community focuses on the unified budget, the rival House of Representatives (HoR) has created a Supreme Constitutional Court in Benghazi, a direct challenge to the authority of the Constitutional Chamber in Tripoli. When the Tripoli court ruled the creation of the Benghazi body unconstitutional on January 28, 2026, the East simply ignored it, effectively creating two parallel legal universes.
In her briefing to the UNSC on April 22, Hanna Tetteh, head of UNSMIL, warned against the “profoundly negative consequences for the country’s unity” resulting from this split. She pointed out that the “persistence of two constitutional bodies and two parallel Supreme Judicial Councils” amounts to the weaponization of the judiciary – which, until last year, was the final glue holding Libya together. This dangerous rift now allows for unilateral decisions regarding the appointment and transfer of senior judicial officers and, even more critically, the relocation of key judicial bodies from Western to Eastern Libya. This newly created legal environment further entrenches institutional fragmentation, making the current split legally binding and pushing the country toward a permanent partition.
Ultimately, the April 2026 milestone of a unified budget is less a bridge to stability and more a tombstone for the electoral process. While Western capitals issued celebratory statements, Tetteh’s warning served as a stark reality check. In her briefing to the UNSC she laid bare a “distorted political economy” where national wealth is being weaponized to legitimize and maintain the status quo rather than fund a transition. By granting this 190-billion-dinar seal of approval, the international community has inadvertently signaled to Libya’s rival elites that the ballot box is optional; they no longer need to win an election to access the state’s coffers, they only need to maintain the stalemate.
While the macro-strategy by Washington leans toward a shared-power status quo, a more granular technical breakthrough emerged on April 29, 2026, in Rome. Facilitated by UNSMIL, the smaller Dialogue Small Group – an eight-member working group representing authorities from both the East and West – reached a consensus on restructuring the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) board. They agreed on a mechanism to fill long-standing vacancies and recommended that the attorney general nominate an independent judge to serve as chairperson. On the surface, this resolves the critical first step of the UN roadmap, a milestone Tetteh championed in her mission to respond to the 2.8 million Libyans registered voters.
However, this technical fix sits in uncomfortable tension with a far more cynical political reality. While the Rome group tinkers with election machinery, Boulos has been putting the final touches to a “pragmatic” arrangement that would, indefinitely, bypass the ballot box: a formalized joint government featuring Saddam Haftar (son of Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army and de facto leader of eastern Libya) as head of the Presidential Council and Abdul-Hamid Dbeibah remaining as prime minister.
This “Boulos Doctrine” has already met a fierce local resistance. On April 6, the High Council of State officially voted to issue a “firm rejection” of the proposal, a sentiment echoed by the Grand Mufti and powerful Misratan groups, who view it as a family-led duopoly that trades national sovereignty for a manufactured stability.
The failure of the outside-in approach is mirrored by the quiet collapse of the UN’s own “bottom-up” experiment. Launched in December 2025, Tetteh’s Structured Dialogue was pitched as an inclusive, four-track engine for national consensus involving over 120 diverse participants, including the late Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’s political team.
However, as the process nears its early-June deadline, the engine is idling. Members of the dialogue have revealed that while the tracks for reconciliation and human rights have produced lofty recommendations, the more critical tracks – security and the formation of a unified temporary government – remain deadlocked.
This internal paralysis is what ultimately forced the UN to pivot toward the “Small Group” meeting in Rome. By retreating from a 120-member inclusive dialogue to a closed-door smaller gathering, the UN has essentially admitted that its broad social roadmap has lost its way. The mission is no longer trying to solve the Libyan crisis through popular consensus; it is instead hunting for a technicality that can be sold as “progress” to the Security Council, even as the broader political foundation crumbles.
Libya in May 2026 has become the world’s most sophisticated hybrid state – a “Libyan Mirage” where the polished symbols of sovereignty are used to mask the absence of a unified nation. By focusing on technical breakthroughs in Rome and financial truces at the Central Bank, the international community is attempting to build the roof of a house that has no foundation. As long as the “Boulos Doctrine” prioritizes stability through elite power-sharing over the democratic will of the 2.8 million registered voters, this functional fragmentation will only deepen.
The unified budget is thus becoming the operating capital for a permanent partition. Without a single judicial authority to validate the law, or a unified government to secure the desert hinterlands, Libya remains a country on paper only. It is tragic proof of a new geopolitical reality: while you can successfully unify the bank accounts of rival generals, you cannot buy the soul of a nation. Libya is no longer a failed state in the traditional sense; it is something far more haunting – a functioning bureaucracy of division.
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.
